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fore, if the opinion of the Court had been more closely aligned
with the somewhat more narrow opinion of Justice Goldberg (an
opinion which, incidentally, should surely be less distasteful to Justices White and Harlan), the hypothetical statute which, as mentioned above, invaded a seeming first amendment privacy might
well be found to invade the liberty concept of the fifth amendment
as broadened by the ninth amendment.
For its failure to locate the right to marital privacy within the
penumbra of a specific amendment, the Court's holding may prove
to be too unwieldly to be useful in future litigation. But, while this
onission causes an incomplete utilization of the ninth amendment,
the Court's holding that the right to marital privacy lies somewhere
on the periphery of the Bill of Rights will perhaps prove to be quite
strong in itself, for marital privacy encompasses a multitude of
fundamental privacies that have heretofore gone unrecognized. Marital privacy, however, has become a unique right, one separate
: '2 It seems that
from a greater right-"the right to be let alone."
the
Court's opinion may have laid the groundwork for the future interpretation that the right to be let alone was the right which was actually
invaded in Connecticut.
George C. Piper
TonTs-LnirrAION OF ACmIONS-EsTrOPPEL.- Appellants were involved

in an automobile collision with appellee's insured. An insurance
adjuster, appellee's agent, visited appellants three times within the
next four months. The claims of the parties are in conflict, but according to appellants, the adjuster told them that appellee would
take care of everything, that he wanted them to get well, and that
they should call him when they determined the amount of their
expenses. Appellee never paid appellants' expenses. More than one
year after the collision, the appellants brought suit, and the appellee
relied on the Kentucky one-year statute of limitations.' Appellants
maintained that appellee should be estopped to plead the limitation,
in that appellee had obstructed the prosecution of the action within
the one-year period. 2 The trial court dismissed appellants' claim.
Held: Affirmed. Appellants are presumed to know that their action
will be barred after one year. They had no right to rely on the
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928).
Rev. Stat. 413.140 (1) [hereinafter cited as KRS].
'Although there is a statute covering this matter, KRS 413.190 (2), it is
vaguely worded and is always construed in light of the common law.
IKy.
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representations of the adjuster, who is their "adversary."3 Cuppy v.
General Accident Fire & Life Assurance Corporation, 378 S.A.2d
629 (Ky. 1964).3.
The result reached in this case is in keeping with previous Kentucky decisions, but it is apparently in opposition to that of all other
states. 4 The first Kentucky case directly in point is Jackson v. Jackson.5 Plaintiff alleged that the adjuster for defendant's insurer told
her that her claim would be settled, that once she had filed a claim
with his company a civil action was unnecessary, and that he could
not settle her claim until she was dismissed by her doctors. The
court relied on Hopperton v. Louisville & N.R. Co. 6 and Bryant v.
BryantF in affirming the dismissal of plaintiff's claim. In Bryant,
there was an express repudiation of the promise to pay, six months
before the action was barred. In Hopperton, the misrepresentations
were of law only, not of fact. Neither case involved misrepresentations by an insurance adjuster.
The next case in point after Jackson is Pospisil v. Miller.8 There,
the adjuster allegedly told plaintiff that his company had "assumed
and recognized its liability to the plaintiff," 9 that she would be fully
compensated without having to consult an attorney, and that a
settlement would be made when she recovered and when the amount
of her medical expenses had been ascertained. Her claim was dismissed, the court citing Jackson and Hopperton. The next case is
Burke v. Blair.'0 It is similar in facts and results and relies mainly
upon Pospisil.
The principle case is the latest one in Kentucky. It relies directly
upon Pospisil and Burke, and indirectly, of course, upon the line of
cases discussed above. The law remains that, absent a firm offer to
settle the claim for a specified amount, a fiducial or trust relationship between the parties, a promise of payment for an agreement
not to sue (attackable by way of the statute of frauds, if not in
writing), or a concealment of facts which prevented the institution
of a suit, misrepresentations of fact inducing the plaintiff not to file
'suit within the prescribed period will not estop the defendant from
3 Appellants also entered on a contract theory, but failed because of the
statute of frauds KRS 371.010.
a 24 A.L.R.2d 1413, § 13.
453 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 25.

5313 S.W.2d 868 (Ky.
617 Ky. L. Rep. 1322,
7246 S.W.2d 457 (Ky.
8343 S.W.2d 392 (Ky.
9 343 S.W.2d at 393.

1958).
34 S.W. 895 (1896).
1952).

1961); see Note, 41 Texas L. Rev. 147 (1962).

10349 S.W.2d 836 (Ky. 1961).
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claiming the statute of limitations as a bar to the action." The following test, outlined in Corpus Juris. Secundum, is frequently in-

voked: "The fraud must be of a character to prevent inquiry, or to
elude investigation, or otherwise to mislead the party having the
cause of action .

.

. and the plaintiff is under a duty to exercise

reasonable care and diligence."' 2 However, Kentucky courts construe such rules so strictly against the plaintiff, that the aforementioned four categories exhaust the cases in which estoppel is granted.
All other states apparently take the opposite position, though
cases directly in point are difficult to find. In Massachusetts, the
defendant was estopped from pleading the statute of limitations
after he assured the injured plaintiffs father that his company would
pay all damages and persuaded him not to secure a lawyer.13 In
Pennsylvania, the following test is used: "If through fraud or concealment the defendant causes the plaintiff to relax his vigilence or
deviate from his right of inquiry, the defendant is estopped from

14
invoking the bar of limitation of action."

In California, where the defendant's conduct is such as to mislead
the plaintiff, or where he lulls the plaintiff into a false security, he
may be estopped. 15
It would seem that the Kentucky court should modify its position. The doctrine of estoppel is equitable in nature, and it should
therefore be applied with a specially keen eye on justice. Granted
that every man must be presumed to know the law, granted that
the prudent man would regard an insurance adjuster as his legal
adversary, it is when such stringent rules as these reach unjust and
unreasonable results that any proper reply to them should be freely
received by the court.
It is sometimes argued that a liberal use of estoppel will encourage plaintiffs in making fraudulent claims. In this situation however, the alternative is to encourage disreputable insurance companies in misleading the unwary injured plaintiff and to give the
insurer every legal advantage when he is already in possession of
the more powerful economic lever.
James T. Waitman
11 Id. at 838.
53 C.J.S. Limitation of Actions § 25.
13 MacKeen v. Kasinskas, 333 Mass. 695, 132 N.E.2d 732 (1956); see also,
McLearn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617, 77 A.L.R. 1039 (1931).
14 Nesbitt v. Erie Coach, 416 Pa. 89, 204 A.2d 473 (1964).
'G United States Cas. Co. %.Industrial Accident Comm., 122 Cal. App. 2d
427, 265 P.2d 35 (1954).

